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Election Campaigns and Democracy:
A Review of James A. Gardner,
What Are Campaigns For? The Role of
Persuasion in Electoral Law and Politics
RICHARD BRIFFAULT†
What are election campaigns for? Not much, according
to Professor James A. Gardner—or, at least, not nearly as
much as the critics of American election campaigns would
have us believe. In his new book, What Are Campaigns For?
The Role of Persuasion in Electoral Law and Politics,1
Professor Gardner contends that instead of serving as
settings for extended discussion or indepth reflection
concerning political beliefs, the ideal election campaign does
little more than make it more likely that the voter will cast
a ballot consistent with the beliefs that he or she held before
the start of the campaign. Nor, to turn to the subtitle of
Professor Gardner’s book, is there much role for persuasion
in electoral politics. “[V]oters are not persuaded during a
campaign to embrace, or even in most cases to contemplate,
ideas that are unfamiliar or that challenge their existing
beliefs.”2 Instead of a forum for debate and persuasion, a
campaign is really just an exercise in, to use his words,
“tabulation,” that is, “counting heads.”3
This may sound like a grim description of elections, and
the setup for a jeremiad bemoaning the sorry state of
American democracy. But Professor Gardner’s elegant
analysis of the theory and practice of election campaigns is
far from that. His point, and it is an important one, is not to
† Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
1. JAMES A. GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR? THE ROLE OF PERSUASION

IN ELECTORAL LAW AND POLITICS (2009).

2. Id. at 104.
3. Id. at 182.
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criticize election campaigns but to diminish the centrality of
campaigns for democracy by situating campaigns within the
broader continuum of democratic practices. As long as there
are opportunities for deliberation, debate, and exposure to
conflicting beliefs in society generally, the lack of persuasive
discussion in campaigns is not of great moment. To be sure,
there may not be adequate exposure to contending points of
view, challenges to majoritarian beliefs, or engagement in
thoughtful political discussion in civil society generally. But
for Professor Gardner that is the real problem to be
addressed, not what does or does not go on in election
campaigns.
In making his case for the limited function of election
campaigns, Professor Gardner proceeds both descriptively
and normatively. He succinctly reviews extensive
literatures in political history, political sociology, and
political theory. He finds that the ideal of the deliberative
campaign, in which voters reason with and attempt to
persuade one another about important political issues, is a
relatively recent one.4 He then distills several decades of
empirical political science to find that voters “almost never
change their beliefs and opinions to any significant degree
during campaigns.”5 Instead, voters bring to campaigns
political beliefs that develop over a lifetime.6 These beliefs
are relatively stable and unlikely to be changed by
something as transient as an election campaign. As
Professor Gardner explains, “studies demonstrate that
attempts to persuade voters during election campaigns face
extremely significant obstacles in the form of cognitive
biases, informationprocessing strategies, and social
dynamics that together work with exceptional power to
stabilize an individual’s beliefs.”7 Turning to the scholarship
concerning democratic theory, Professor Gardner considers
the multiple contemporary variants of democratic theory
and finds that none of them—even those that give great
4. Id. at 1343.
5. Id. at 86.
6. Id. at 9293.
7. Id. at 94.
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weight to deliberation generally—require deliberative
elections. “[D]eliberative democracy requires only that
meaningful public deliberation about pressing issues of
public concern occur at some times and in some forums,”8 he
writes. “[T]hose times and forums need not coincide with
opportunities available during formal campaigns for public
office.”9
In short, we can have a healthy democracy without
deliberative election campaigns. That is a good thing as,
given the way political public opinion forms and only slowly
changes, we are unlikely to have “campaigns in which
citizens actually open themselves to a deep form of
persuasion.”10
Professor Gardner observes that “[a]lthough the
significance of elections for democracy is a common point of
emphasis in many theoretical accounts of democracy,
election campaigns are surprisingly undertheorized.”11 I
suspect this point is as true for election law scholarship as it
is for democratic theory, so election law specialists are
surely indebted to Professor Gardner’s erudite effort to
provide a scholarly framework for legal analysis of election
campaigns. And a central theme of the book—that election
campaigns have to be seen within the context of political
public opinion formation and democratic action more
generally—is surely correct. Democracy goes on all the
time—in rallies, blog posts, online social networks,
community organizations, town hall meetings, letters to
representatives, and calls to radio talk shows. Elections are
not all there is to democracy.
Yet, in seeking to counter the tendency of some writers
to make elections the focal point of democracy and to set
such a high deliberative bar for election campaigns that our
campaigns cannot possibly measure up, Professor Gardner
may have gone too far in the other direction. Elections are
not just another blip on the democratic radar screen;
8. Id. at 13435.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 118.
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moreover, there is more activity that can be properly
described as involving persuasion in election campaigns
than fits Professor Gardner “tabulative campaign” model.12
This critique has implications for Professor Gardner’s
recommendations for election campaign law. Consistent
with his view that election campaigns are not so central for
democratic debate, Professor Gardner contends that we
ought to feel freer to regulate campaigns. As he puts it:
[L]owering our aspirations for campaigns also opens
constitutional space for much more extensive and indeed highly
intrusive regulation of the campaign process. Were we to jettison
the idea that campaigns . . . must be important forums for
meaningful political debate and persuasion, extensive regulatory
oversight of the campaign arena could no longer be seen as deeply
threatening to core democratic values.13

If, however, more is happening in an election campaign
than merely “tabulating public opinion as accurately as
possible,”14 then the argument for increased regulation,
particularly of campaign finance, which is the election law
subject to which Professor Gardner gives the greatest
attention, must fail.
My first point is that although Professor Gardner is
right to remind us that election campaigns are only one
episode of the larger unfolding democratic saga, he fails to
acknowledge adequately that elections play a unique role in
democracy because they make decisions that bind an entire
polity for a period of time. Elections choose the public
officers who make, enforce, or adjudicate laws. In the case of
voterinitiated ballot propositions, voters actually enact
laws directly. An election’s outcome directly affects what
government does thereafter. Elected officials hold office for
terms of years. Voterenacted laws remain law until
overturned or changed by the voters at a subsequent
election. That is, of course, the whole point of selecting
government and making laws by popular election.

12. Id. at 14789.
13. Id. at 171.
14. Id. at 172.
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Moreover, elections can matter. Political public opinion
may be relatively stable and popular beliefs on the major
issues of the day may evolve only slowly, but elections, even
those decided by modest margins, can results in sharp shifts
in public policy that have major consequences for society.
George Bush’s narrow election in 2000 led directly to deep
tax cuts and ultimately to the invasion of Iraq. Barack
Obama’s election in 2008 led to the enactment of major
health care reform legislation. Had either the 2000 or 2008
elections come out differently, the public policy results
would surely have been very different. Elections matter—
they have consequences—in a way different from other
forms of democratic deliberation.
Professor Gardner implicitly acknowledges this
distinction but in a way that suggests that the election
decision is actually less important than more general
democratic
deliberation.
He
notes
that
“elected
representatives are by definition a kind of instrumentality
that polities use to advance their aims” so that “the decision
about which representative to elect is therefore to some
degree intrinsically a decision about a choice of means” not
of broader public ends.15 With the election merely about
means rather than ends, the campaign is likely to unfold in
“a thin, instrumental mode in which voters will find it
unnecessary to discuss or even to contemplate their deeper
conceptions of collective ends.”16 Yet this merely
“instrumental” electoral event will have binding
consequences for the “collective ends” that the resulting
government may choose to pursue when it wields state
power.
To be sure, to say that elections matter does not address
Professor Gardner’s central contention that election
campaigns do not matter, or, at least, that they do not
matter much. Here my disagreement with Professor
Gardner is less with what he says—his argument that the
votes of most people most of the time reflect their pre
campaign beliefs and predispositions is surely well
15. Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 139.
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grounded in the political science literature—than with the
way he says it. Specifically, the problem grows out of the
way he sets up the dichotomy between persuasive/
deliberative campaigns and tabulative campaigns, and, in
particular, the extensive territory that his use of the term
tabulative covers. In Professor Gardner’s terminology
campaigns
are
either
“persuasive/deliberative”
or
“tabulative.” In persuasive campaigns, voters make up their
minds about fundamental political questions regarding
public ends during the course of a campaign based on the
information provided and the rational, factbased
arguments made during the campaign. In a persuasive
campaign—again using Professor Gardner’s terminology—
public political opinion would be campaignendogenous; that
is, voters’ beliefs about significant issues would be
determined during the campaign by a process of reasoned
publicregarding assessment of the contents of campaign
messages, perhaps in discussions with other voters. Any
campaign in which this does not occur—in which,
specifically, voters do not reconsider and change
fundamental political beliefs—is not persuasive but is,
instead, tabulative. In a tabulative campaign all that
happens is that voters learn to sort themselves and line up
behind the candidates according to their precampaign—
their “campaignexogenous”—beliefs. The goal for the
design of such a campaign is only to make sure the voter is
tabulated accurately, that is, that he or she votes for the
candidate, party, or position on a ballot proposition that
best tallies with his or her campaignexogenous beliefs.
At times, Professor Gardner’s insight into campaigns is
occluded by his use of the term tabulative to describe
anything that does not meet the high standard of
persuasionasreconsiderationoffundamental beliefs. Thus,
near the end of the book he writes “a tabulative campaign is
not primarily about forming or influencing public opinion; it
is about counting heads. Such a campaign is therefore
largely administrative, even ministerial, rather than
political.”17 Well, this reflects a very narrow—dare I say,
idiosyncratic—definition of “political,” much as the
17. Id. at 18283.
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persuasive/tabulative dichotomy is based on a very narrow
definition of persuasive and a very broad definition of
tabulative.
As Professor Gardner repeatedly acknowledges, an
awful lot of what could reasonably be called persuasion can
go on in our tabulative campaigns. As he notes:
[B]ecause voters may not necessarily know how to decide which
set of actions and policies will best achieve the ends that they
want elected officials to pursue, candidates may attempt to
persuade voters “to make new connections between specific
problems and specific offices”—to persuade voters, that is to say,
of the political salience of certain information and ideas.”18

In other words, a voter may be deeply committed to the
free market economy and unwilling to contemplate any
ideas that would shake that belief, but may be uncertain
whether that commitment entails more or less regulation of
the financial services industry or bailouts for big banks, and
he or she may be open to persuasion on that point. Or a
voter may be committed to expanding health insurance
coverage but may be unsure whether the best way to do that
is through health savings accounts, an individual mandate,
or a public insurance program. Candidate, party, or political
committee efforts to get voters to back one of these policy
options or another strike me as persuasive, but because
they don’t attempt to get voters to reconsider fundamental
commitments, Professor Gardner would dismiss campaigns
built around such efforts as still merely tabulative and thus,
“administrative,” “ministerial,” and “political.”
To be sure, many campaign messages may not even
attempt to persuade voters of the merits of a specific policy
but instead focus on the positions, experiences, record in
office, character, or personality of particular candidates.
The goal of such campaigns is, as Professor Gardner
explains, to influence the voter’s determination of which
candidate “will most reliably do what I think should be
done.”19 Yet, surely, this too involves appeals to a voter’s
deliberative capacity. A voter still must make the decision
18. Id. at 106 (quoting SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER 45 (1991)).
19. Id. at 105.
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whether to vote and, if so, for whom. This decision may
closely follow, and may be predictable from, the voter’s pre
campaign beliefs or predispositions, but it still involves
some sort of decision. Only after that decision is made can
there be tabulation.
Professor Gardner dismisses as merely tabulative, and
not involving deliberation or persuasion, any campaigning
that does not entail consideration and, especially, voter re
consideration, of fundamental political commitments. But
this misses the point of an election, which is not a society
wide seminar on political issues but the collective decision
of who should wield public power and whether specific
ballot measures should be enacted into law. Determining
whether specific candidates or policies best advance the
political beliefs of the voters is the kind of deliberation most
appropriate to the election decision. And persuasion aimed
at influencing that decision is campaignappropriate
persuasion. By denying that campaigns involve anything
that can be considered to involve deliberation or persuasion,
Professor Gardner has fallen for what he calls the
Campaign Critique—the “view that campaigns ought to
serve as forums for some kind of meaningful public
deliberation on important political issues”20—which his book
challenges. In emphasizing that campaigns do not meet his
definition of deliberation or persuasion, he eliminates all
deliberation or persuasion from campaigns. But a better
definition of the purpose of a campaign might be that it
ought to enable the voters to make an intelligent decision
concerning the questions they are actually asked to decide.
In which case, some of the activity that Professor Gardner
labels tabulative might be seen as persuasive. Or perhaps
the difficulty is based on what counts as “important political
issues.” Professor Gardner never actually addresses that.
But if tax cuts, health insurance reform, or financial
services regulation are “important political issues,” then at
least some of our campaigns are at least partly persuasive
or deliberative and not merely tabulative in the
administrative or ministerial sense used by Professor
Gardner.
20. Id. at 2.
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Again, I don’t want to overstate my disagreement with
Professor Gardner. The literature he discusses shows that
the votes of most voters can be predicted based on their pre
existing views, commitments, and predispositions; relatively
few voters change their minds during campaigns, and in the
many elections that are not close the campaign may not
matter much at all. But some elections are close. In some
elections, some voters may not be sure which candidates or
policies best suit their predispositions. Voters may change
their minds concerning which candidate to support or
whether to bother voting at all. Some campaigns do affect
electoral outcomes—and the government and the public
policies that come out of the election—even if not all
campaigns do. These elections may not reach the rarified
level of persuasive or deliberative that Professor Gardner
articulates, but it does not seem right to characterize them
as merely tabulative, especially if tabulative is equated with
“administrative” or “ministerial.”
This not just a question of semantics as it is evident
that Professor Gardner’s view that campaigns have the
minimal deliberative content and persuasive effect captured
by his use of the term tabulative has influenced his
approach to election campaign law. According to Professor
Gardner, his book is “in the end primarily an inquiry into
the condition of the constitutional law of election
campaigns,”21 and Professor Gardner examines a number of
election law topics, particularly campaign finance law.22
Consistent with his view that campaigns do not have much
consequence, he suggests that we be less concerned about
the dramatically unequal campaign resources current
campaign finance law permits. If campaigns were really
deliberative, then unequal resources would give the side
with the greater war chest “more extensive opportunities to
persuade voters to its point of view,” which seems “unfair.”23
But if “public opinion is understood as campaignexogenous,
and campaigns as tabulative, inequality of campaign
21. Id. at 118.
22. Id. at 5557, 7082, 17477.
23. Id. at 174.
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resources looks much more benign.”24 At most, the candidate
with more resources will have an advantage in mobilizing
her precampaign supporters, but on the assumption that it
costs less to mobilize a supporter than to win over a new
one, this advantage of more money does not seem that great
and “the urgency of equalizing campaign spending is
reduced.”25
On the other hand, Professor Gardner contends that the
tabulative model, while making campaign money less
important, also provides support for a doctrinal shift that
would make even “highly intrusive” campaign finance
regulation less constitutionally problematic. If we “conceive
of a campaign as little more than one phase of an essentially
ministerial process of counting heads,”26 then there would be
little reason to give campaign speech and campaign
spending the powerful constitutional protection the Court
currently accords them. “Campaign speech no longer
implicates the core democratic process of public opinion
formation,”27 but might instead “be analogized . . . to
commercial speech aimed at inducing consumption.”28 On
the tabulative model, what campaign speech primarily aims
to do is “to match buyers with appropriate sellers in an
electoral marketplace, and as a result to be an appropriate
arena for regulatory action aimed at protecting the
efficiency of marketplace sorting mechanisms.”29
This is truly breathtaking. Instead of election
campaigns constituting the zenith of democratic political
engagement, Professor Gardner would demote them below
the level of nonelectoral political speech; indeed, he would
recharacterize them as not even political but commercial.
Under the tabulative model, government regulation of
campaign speech would be subject not to strict judicial
scrutiny, but to a much more relaxed standard of judicial
24. Id. at 175.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 176.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 177.
29. Id.
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review. To be sure, other scholars have sought to
distinguish electoral speech from other political speech in
order to justify greater governmental regulation of the
former than the latter,30 and campaign finance law—which
regulates campaign money, but not money used in political
activity generally—requires the same distinction. But these
efforts have relied on the greater justification for regulating
electoral campaign spending in the name of democracy, not
the relative unimportance of election campaigns.
Professor Gardner’s proposal fails for the same reason
as his effort to describe all current campaign efforts at
persuasion as tabulative. Campaign messages do have
persuasive content addressed to the fundamental political
questions of who should hold office, what policies should
government advance, and whether proposed rules should be
adopted. Given the predispositions and cognitive biases of
most voters, these messages may often fail to persuade, but
persuasion is their aim—if only to persuade voters who
already hold the views put forward by the messages to
actually vote. This is political speech by any constitutional
standard. Professor Gardner’s use of the tabulative model to
treat electioneering as akin to commercial speech only
undermines his effort to persuade us that the tabulative
model is the better description of election campaigns. There
are many reasons to support greater regulation of campaign
finance, but the idea that campaign speech is more
commercial than political is not one of them.
***
The great strength of Professor Gardner’s book is that it
reminds us to situate our thinking about elections and
election campaigns in the theory and practice of democracy.
Elections are important, but they are far from the only
setting in which democratic engagement occurs. Indeed, the
health of our democracy—and of our elections—requires
that democracy be practiced widely throughout civil society
and public life. We err in placing too much of the weight of
30. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999); Frederick Schauer &
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1803 (1999).
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our democratic expectations on elections, and in focusing
efforts to improve democracy so intensely that we fail to
address democracy issues in society more broadly. Election
campaigns are a phase of democracy—an important phase—
but not all there is to democracy.
However, in making these valuable points—and pulling
together the empirical and theoretical literatures on which
he relies—I fear Professor Gardner goes too far in
minimizing what campaigns do and what we can look to
them to do. Campaigns have persuasive content, even if
voters are, at best, only infrequently persuaded to change
their fundamental political beliefs, and they can have
deliberative consequences, even if that deliberation involves
voter reflection on how specific voting decisions will advance
their precampaign ends and not voter reconsideration of
those ends. Accordingly, the tabulative model—in Professor
Gardner’s sense of tabulative as administrative or
ministerial, not political—cannot provide a fully satisfactory
foundation for election law.
To the extent that the
tabulative model emphasizes the need for a complete and
accurate count of voter preferences—and thus focuses on
the need to facilitate voting,31 to increase the range of voting
options available to voters,32 and to make it easier to
determine which candidates
best
satisfy voters’
preferences33—it is surely useful for thinking about election
law and policy. But using the tabulative model to deny that
election campaigns include messages intended to persuade
voter decisions that can affect election outcomes obscures
more than it enlightens and will have little effect on
campaign law.

31. See GARDNER, supra note 1, at 181.
32. See id. at 17274.
33. Id. at 18182.

